Did you know that nuke regulators are not ALLOWED to examine nuke plant accident guidelines?

[kristopher]

This piece provides great insight into the nature of the problems that cause the only safety conscious Nuclear Regulatory Commissioner to lose his job.

White House Moves Swiftly To Replace NRC’s Jaczko

...In the wake of the Fukushima Daiichi meltdowns, Jaczko found himself at odds with the other four and the staff over the assessment of safety margins at Mark 1 boiling water reactors – including Hope Creek and Oyster Creek in New Jersey – which are the same as those destroyed due to loss of power and an inability to operate their safety systems in the aftermath of the Japanese earthquake and tsunami. While all such plants are required to have Severe Accident Management Guidelines – written plans as to what to do to protect the public in the event of a reactor meltdown – they had not been evaluated to determine if they actually worked.

“I used to teach students – who were becoming NRC reactor inspectors – about the SAM Guidelines,” said David Lochbaum, nuclear safety engineer at UCS who taught at the NRC in 2009. “The first thing we taught our students was you are not allowed to look at these guidelines at your plant sites. You can’t find out if they are good, bad, or indifferent.

“You have procedures to protect the public and the NRC can’t look at them. What kind of game is this? It seems that in severe accidents you don’t have to provide training, or have the right equipment. All you have to do is have written procedures somewhere and then wave a magic wand and everything will be fine.”

In the wake of the March 11 disaster in Japan the NRC ordered special inspections of the SAMG documents in all 104 of the nation’s reactors. They found at Indian Point, near New York City, and others, that while plants may have been designed to meet earthquake standards, the necessary systems to protect the reactor – such as fire equipment or the water mains coming in from the municipality – were not seismically hardened and, therefore, could be useless in a real emergency.

Jaczko’s last showdown...

http://spoonsenergymatters.wordpress.com/

[TheWraith]

1. Um, you know that that's total bullshit, right?

The NRC WRITES accident guidelines. You shouldn't blindly repeat crazy stuff you find on conspiracy blogs.

[kristopher]

2. When the cost of reactors soared to $6K/kw+ you insisted they were only $1500/KW

You also glommed onto a website that posted obviously false accounting of deaths/kwh (the sources it cited completely refuted the claims made) and kept posting that for about 2 years. And those are just two of many many many more false claims you've made on behalf of this completely corrupt megacorp industry.

Lochbaum, on the other hand, is a highly qualified scientist working at one of the most respected NGOs out there. Now we have you saying that he lacks credibility? That's a hoot.

“I used to teach students – who were becoming NRC reactor inspectors – about the SAM Guidelines,” said David Lochbaum, nuclear safety engineer at UCS who taught at the NRC in 2009. “The first thing we taught our students was you are not allowed to look at these guidelines at your plant sites. You can’t find out if they are good, bad, or indifferent.

“You have procedures to protect the public and the NRC can’t look at them. What kind of game is this? It seems that in severe accidents you don’t have to provide training, or have the right equipment. All you have to do is have written procedures somewhere and then wave a magic wand and everything will be fine.”

I can't help but think you have a lot of first hand knowledge about the subject you wrote about here:
http://www.democraticunderground.com/1002913823

[XemaSab]

15. Please don't call other people trolls

Thanks

[bananas]

3. Direct link to that blog entry for future reference

http://spoonsenergymatters.wordpress.com/2012/05/25/white-house-moves-swiftly-to-replace-nrcs-jaczko/

edit to add: good article and an interesting website - thanks.

[FBaggins]

4. The NRC audited the SAMGs well over a year ago.

In fact Lochbaum wrote a piece about it right after Fukushima.

So it would be dishonest to say that they aren't ALLOWED to examine them.

It would particularly dishonest to phrase it that way because they ARE allowed (required in fact) to examine EPGs (Emergency Procedure Guidelines) and test operators on them. These are likely what The Wraith was referring to and clearly count as "nuke plant accident guidelines".

SAMGs are industry-developed plans that go beyond what the NRC requires, so they are by definition outside of the NRC auditor's authority to quiz operators on.

The same thing happens in any regulated industry. Take for instance the FTC's regulations on how financial institutions handle identity theft situations. The regulators can ask whatever they like about the "red flags" guidelines that they require the banks to implement. But say some bank has come up with their own additional protection. Maybe they're added biometric information onto their debit card and an ATM automatically protects the card from being used by anyone without the same facial structure. The bank has their own internal procedures on how to manage that process. The auditors don't gain the ability to audit that function...

... more importantly, it would be a bald-faced lie to claim that they couldn't examine identity theft protection guidelines at the bank just because they had no regulatory authority outside of their own regulations.

[kristopher]

5. Do you work in the nuclear industry?

What is the source of your information?

[FBaggins]

6. That answer hasn't changed since the last few times you asked it.

No, I don't work in the industry and never have.

What is the source of your information?

Some of us were paying attention post Fukushima to more than Arnie's imagination.

An obvious question for you would be... if you don't know what SAMGs are, why are you posting about them?

[kristopher]

7. What is the source of your information?

[FBaggins]

8. Why?

I told you where the obvious rebuttal to your made up position came from... the very source you thought you were relying on. Are you too lazy to look it up?

You posted an OP about SAMGs... are you too lazy to look up what they are when questioned on them?

You posted a statement ("nuke regulators are not ALLOWED to examine nuke plant accident guidelines&quot that is not supported by the article you linked (itself filled with other errors). At what point would your standard for supporting a position require you to back that up or retract it before insisting that others back up theirs?

I assure you that point passed for me.

[kristopher]

9. Poor Baggins, you're trapped by your attempt to spin Lochbaum's article. aren't you?

If you share the source you also share the fact you are misinforming everyone. The header in the OP is accurate unless you think "emergency" has the same meaning as "accident".

Severe Accident Management Guidelines for Nuclear Reactors
by Dave Lochbaum

The disaster at the Fukushima Dai-Ichi nuclear plant in Japan prompted some people to contend that since U.S. reactors have Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMGs) they are less susceptible to disaster.

A recent NRC audit of SAMGs at the nation's nuclear power plants, however, suggests otherwise. One of the lessons from the 1979 Three Mile Island accident was that U.S. nuclear plants needed better emergency procedures for and training of control room operators. Two sets of procedures were developed.

The first set was the Emergency Procedure Guidelines (EPGs), which were introduced in June 1980 to help the operators respond to emergencies at the plants. These emergencies included transients (e.g., unplanned reactor shutdowns) and accidents (e.g., pipe breaks that drained cooling water from the reactor vessel). The NRC licenses control room operators, and to obtain a license, operator candidates must demonstrate proficiency on the EPGs both on written exams and in control room simulator exercises.

The second set was the SAMGs. They were first introduced in June 1996 to back up the EPGs for severe or unusual events -- those involving multiple failures of safety equipment or unanticipated accident sequences. For example, the EPGs lay out various means of supplying water to the reactor vessel to cool the nuclear core. If none of those options are available, the SAMGs take over to provide options like flooding the containment structure around the reactor vessel with water to a level above the top of the core....

http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2011/lochbaum280611.html

[FBaggins]

10. Oh look! You learned to use Google.

You apparently haven't learned to interpret what you find there... but hey! A step in the right direction nevertheless.

The 6/2011 piece backs up exactly what I said.

The header in the OP is accurate unless you think "emergency" has the same meaning as "accident".

What wild spin! Did you expect anyone to fall for it? So you're saying that they're allowed to look at "Emergency" procedures, but not "Accident" procedures? That's your spin? That's it's ok to claim that they can't look at accident guidelines because what they DO review are called "emergency" guidelines?

Seriously?

You missed that the guidelines with "accident" in the title are beyond the "emergency" guidelines. Right?

The correct title for the OP would be "Shocker! Government regulators do not train their auditors to review things they don't regulate".

[kristopher]

11. Wow!!!

Most people think that managing the consequences of an accident like Fukushima has implications for the public that justify strict and detailed regulatory involvement in the planning process. But you clearly think management of an accident should be left to corporations like BP or TEPCO.

Wow.

Severe Accident Management Guidelines for Nuclear Reactors
by Dave Lochbaum

The disaster at the Fukushima Dai-Ichi nuclear plant in Japan prompted some people to contend that since U.S. reactors have Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMGs) they are less susceptible to disaster.

A recent NRC audit of SAMGs at the nation's nuclear power plants, however, suggests otherwise. One of the lessons from the 1979 Three Mile Island accident was that U.S. nuclear plants needed better emergency procedures for and training of control room operators. Two sets of procedures were developed.

The first set was the Emergency Procedure Guidelines (EPGs), which were introduced in June 1980 to help the operators respond to emergencies at the plants. These emergencies included transients (e.g., unplanned reactor shutdowns) and accidents (e.g., pipe breaks that drained cooling water from the reactor vessel). The NRC licenses control room operators, and to obtain a license, operator candidates must demonstrate proficiency on the EPGs both on written exams and in control room simulator exercises.

The second set was the SAMGs. They were first introduced in June 1996 to back up the EPGs for severe or unusual events -- those involving multiple failures of safety equipment or unanticipated accident sequences. For example, the EPGs lay out various means of supplying water to the reactor vessel to cool the nuclear core. If none of those options are available, the SAMGs take over to provide options like flooding the containment structure around the reactor vessel with water to a level above the top of the core...

.

What are you doing on a progressive website? I can't imagine a more right wing position than the one you are promoting here.

[FBaggins]

12. Should I be shocked?

You make up what an article means to suit your position... why would I think your desperate need to create strawmen was limited to that?

Most people think that managing the consequences of an accident like Fukushima has implications for the public that justify strict and detailed regulatory involvement in the planning process.

Of course it does. Who ever pretended that it didn't? But when you train a regulatory auditor, you train him/her to audit what you require from the company you regulate. You don't train them to go outside of that. And you don't get to pretend that "detailed regulatory involvement" means auditing a requirement that doesn't exist.

Say a nuclear plant is required to have diesel fuel sufficient to operate their generators for a week and the NRC has regulations for how the fuel is stored. Well... then the auditor will certainly be trained to ask about that and verify whatever is on their checklist. But then suppose that the plant owner decided that it was a good idea to have more on hand. So he keeps a pair of tanker trucks filled with diesel and parked on a hill two miles away. Does that suddenly become something the NRC is supposed to audit? Why not, it's safety-related isn't it?

If the NRC decides that a mobile backup supply is a needed safety step, they're free to adjust the regulations and then verify compliance with them. If they haven't decided that, then it's pointless to argue whether or not they check for it. But what you continue to miss is that your OP clearly leaves the reader with the assumption that they aren't even ALLOWED to look at ANY accident guidelines (not that there are extensive plans and they are audited, but that plans that go beyond what is required are not... wait for it... required). That was either ignorance or dishonesty on your part and you owe the reader a correction.

This is the group that has to grant permission to increase the thickness of concrete by more than 1/4" and you're really trying to sell to people that they don't have accident guidelines that they mandate and audit? Really?

What are you doing on a progressive website? I can't imagine a more right wing position than the one you are promoting here.

And there it is. You move right on to your standard fall-back position of calling those who disagree with you names. What a shocker. You do realize that the rest of us see it as a clear sign that you already know you lost and can't admit it even to yourself, right?

[kristopher]

13. "Blah, blah blah... auditing a requirement that doesn't exist... blah blah"

A "requirement that doesn't exist".

That is very well put and it reflects exactly the way right wingers believe the regulatory system should be designed; the less covered by regulatory oversight, the better.

Which is the obvious point of both the OP and Lochbaum.

[RobertEarl]

14. This

"No, I tell you, we can trust the nuclear plant owners and their employees. They would never lie and they are always right. You can't look at their reports (if you could they would be linked right here and now) because it is a matter of national security and corporate profits. And if you don't like national security and corporate profits, move to Siberia. America, love it or leave it."

Now doesn't that make us all glow with, well, pride, or something?