…Ukraine has no nuclear weapons, and no nuclear weapons program. Ukraine has done more for the cause of nuclear non-proliferation than any other country. In the early 1990s, Ukraine had the the third-largest stockpile of nuclear weapons in the world, a legacy of the Soviet Union. It agreed to disarm itself entirely in 1994, in exchange for security guarantees from the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Russian Federation. In 1996, when its nuclear disarmament was completed, sunflowers were planted around Ukraine's empty silos as a sign of peace.

One has to stop and take a deep breath before enunciating the contradictions and perversions of the Kremlin's argument about nuclear weapons, because they are so deep and so numerous. In invading Ukraine, in 2014 and again now, Russia has done more for the cause of nuclear proliferation than any country in the world. It has taught the lesson that countries should keep or build a nuclear arsenal, in order to deter large aggressive neighbors from invading them.

It is not just that Russia has broken its promise to defend Ukraine, which was spelled out in something called the Budapest Memorandum in 1994. It is blaming the country that abandoned nuclear weapons for acquiring them, while itself holding the world's largest nuclear arsenal. And even as Russia does so, Putin is brandishing his own nuclear weapons in a way that is highly irresponsible, suggesting that their use would be acceptable in a senseless war that Russia began without provocation.

… Nothing that the Kremlin has said about Russian war aims actually makes any sense. But it does make nonsense. The war on the ground in Ukraine is all too real. But the Russian war is also fought in and for unreality, to extend its hold on our minds as far as possible. When unreality spreads, reality becomes more murderous.

The senseless talk about nuclear weapons is an example of this. But, as I will hope to keep showing, the creation of of nonsense is an essential element of Russian warfighting. As such, it calls for analysis, and resistance.

https://snyder.substack.com/p/how-to-read-perversion?s=r&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=email

In countries like Russia, where the currency is not so stable, the ability to convert to a strong and trusted one like the dollar or the euro is crucial. It is evidence that the home currency — in this case the Russian ruble — has value. Russia’s vast store of foreign exchange backs up that value. It assures households and businesses that they can convert their rubles whenever they want, and makes sure that the nation can protect its exchange rate with other currencies.. The reserves also lubricate the day-to-day transactions of Russian businesses that export and import.

But once workers and managers, owners and financiers worry that they can’t trade their rubles for dollars or euros — because banks won’t be able to access their foreign exchange reserves — they lose confidence. The Bank of Russia can try to prop up the value of the ruble by using its reserves to buy up rubles that people are selling. But it can only do that as long as it has access to foreign reserves.

The question is how long it can make those transactions. According to Mr. Bernstam’s calculations, Russian individuals and companies have deposited $268 billion in foreign denominations in Russian banks.

Yet the central bank has just about $12 billion of cash in hand — an astonishingly small amount, he said. As for the rest of Russia’s foreign exchange reserves, roughly $400 billion is invested in assets held outside the country. Another $84 billion is invested in Chinese bonds and $139 billion is in gold. The central bank could trade in some of those bonds for renminbi, which would enable it to buy goods from China, but not from other countries. It could also sell gold, although Mr. Bernstam argues that there will be few buyers for the massive tons that Russia has on hand.

Other estimates put the amount of assets held outside Russia closer to $300 billion. The potentially dire consequences for the economy are the same.

“If the ruble collapses, it could usher in severe inflation and exacerbate a brewing recession,” Robert Person, an associate professor of international relations at the United States Military Academy, said, noting that his views were his own and not those of the government or military. The economic consequences of these measures could turn out to be far more severe than other measures that have gotten more attention in the media,” he added. “This gets at the Russian government’s basic tools to manage its macroeconomy.”

https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/28/business/russia-sanctions-central-bank-ruble.html