HomeLatest ThreadsGreatest ThreadsForums & GroupsMy SubscriptionsMy Posts
DU Home » Latest Threads » Viking12 » Journal
Page: « Prev 1 2


Profile Information

Member since: Thu Jan 15, 2004, 04:23 PM
Number of posts: 6,012

Journal Archives

Reclaim Wisconsin! 62,000 strong rally at Capitol

Photo gallery:


THIS guy? Really, THIS guy is offended at the Presidents remarks about taking war too casually?

Grandpa was on Hannity last night. Outraged, OUTRAGED I tell 'ya, that the President would make such comments.

PMO Scientist Pest Control

Some new and more encouraging polls: Governor and US Senate

Although I think polls 9 months out from an election are meaningless because there's a lack of name recognition, awareness, and a lot can happen, here are the results from recent PPP polls:

Raleigh, N.C. Ė Wisconsin voters are split down the middle in terms of whether to recall Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker, 49%-49%, but a closer look at prospective matchups suggests that Walker is headed for the battle of his political life to survive a recall challenge. Walkerís approval rating sits at 47% approval and 52% disapproval.

With the exception of former Senator Russ Feingold, who would beat Walker 52-45, Walker either wins or loses to a slate of prospective challengers by +/- 3% points. The kicker is that many of Walkerís prospective opponents are far less known than he is, suggesting his challengers may make up even more ground as the electorate gets to know them. Mayor of Milwaukee Tom Barrett is leading Walker 49-46, with a favorability rating of 41/33 and 27% of voters not sure about him. Kathleen Falk leads Walker 48-47, with a 31/42 favorability rating and 27% of voters not sure about her. Walker leads former Congressman David Obey, 47-45, but 43% of voters donít know enough about Obey to register an opinion on his favorability one way or the other. Similarly, Walker leads Jon Erpenbach 47-44, but 59% arenít sure about Erpenbach. The same is true of Peter Barca (Walker wins 48-46, but 57% donít know Barca), Ron Kind (Kind wins 46-45 despite 57% of voters not sure about him), Doug LaFollette (Walker beats him 46-45 with 49% of voters not sure about him), and Kathleen Vinehout - Walker beats her 46-44 with a full 60% of voters not knowing enough about Vinehout to form a favorable or unfavorable opinion of her.


PPP finds that a match up between Tammy Baldwin and Tommy Thompson for the Senate in Wisconsin would be a toss up. Baldwin leads Thompson 46-45 in this month's poll, continuing a pattern of tight numbers in the contest. When PPP last polled Wisconsin in October Thompson was ahead 46-44. This seems like a race that's likely to remain closely contested all throughout the year.

There are no overwhelmingly popular candidates in this race. Thompson's favorability rating is 41%, with 42% of voters seeing him unfavorably. He's popular with Republicans but his crossover appeal is not what it once was. Only 17% of Democrats see him positively and his 41/42 spread with independents matches his overall numbers. Those aren't the kinds of numbers that let him win 60% in his last race for Governor.

Voters are mixed on Baldwin as well, although she is not as well known. 31% see her favorably and 31% have a negative opinion. She is extremely polarizing with Democrats (54/10) pretty much all liking her and Republicans (3/57) all pretty much disliking her.

WisPolitics: (more) Former Walker aides charged in John Doe investigation

WisPolitics: Former Walker aides charged in John Doe investigation

Former Walker aides Kelly Rindfleisch and Darlene Wink were charged today with doing campaign work from their Milwaukee County offices as they sought to raise money for Scott Walkerís guv campaign and Brett Davisí lt. guv bid.

The charges stem from an ongoing John Doe investigation that began following a newspaper report that Wink was posting pro-Walker comments under news stories posted online and doing other political work while in her county office.

Wink resigned that day, and the complaint against Rindfleisch noted a drop in daytime fundraising activities from Walkerís county office immediately afterward.

The complaint said the change was reflected in an email exchanged between Walker from his campaign account and Tim Russell, who was then serving as his housing director in the Department of Health and Human Services.


It's not just about collective bargaining

The Power of the Powerless (1978) -- Vaclav Havel (1936-2011)

Simply the most inspirational piece for those facing irrational, irresponsible govt power.


ASPECETR is haunting Eastern Europe: the specter of what in the West is called "dissent" This secter has not appeared out of thin air. It is a natural and inevitable consequence of the present historical phase of the system it is haunting. It was born at a time when this system, for a thousand reasons, can no longer base itself on the unadulterated, brutal, and arbitrary application of power, eliminating all expressions of nonconformity. What is more, the system has become so ossified politically that there is practically no way for such nonconformity to be implemented within its official structures.

Who are these so-called dissidents? Where does their point of view come from, and what. importance does it have? What is the significance of the "independent initiatives" in which "dissidents" collaborate, and what real chances do such initiatives have of success? Is it appropriate to refer to "dissidents" as an opposition? If so, what exactly is such an opposition within the framework of this system? What does it do? What role does it play in society? What are its hopes and on what are they based? Is it within the power of the "dissidents"-as a category of subcitizen outside the power establishment-to have any influence at all on society and the social system? Can they actually change anything?

I think that an examination of these questions-an examination of the potential of the "powerless"-can only begin with an examination of the nature of power in the circumstances in which these powerless people operate.


Our system is most frequently characterized as a dictatorship or, more precisely, as the dictatorship of a political bureaucracy over a society which has undergone economic and social leveling. I am afraid that the term "dictatorship," regardless of how intelligible it may otherwise be, tends to obscure rather than clarify the real nature of power in this system. We usually associate the term with the notion of a small group of people who take over the government of a given country by force; their power is wielded openly, using the direct instruments of power at their disposal, and they are easily distinguished socially from the majority over whom they rule. One of the essential aspects of this traditional or classical notion of dictatorship is the assumption that it is temporary, ephemeral, lacking historical roots. Its existence seems to be bound up with the lives of those who established it. It is usually local in extent and significance, and regardless of the ideology it utilizes to grant itself legitimacy, its power derives ultimately from the numbers and the armed might of its soldiers and police. The principal threat to its existence is felt to be the possibility that someone better equipped in this sense might appear and overthrow it.

Even this very superficial overview should make it clear that the system in which we live has very little in common with a classical dictatorship. In the first place, our system is not limited in a local, geographical sense; rather, it holds sway over a huge power bloc controlled by one of the two superpowers. And although it quite naturally exhibits a number of local and historical variations, the range of these variations is fundamentally circumscribed by a single, unifying framework throughout the power bloc. Not only is the dictatorship everywhere based on the same principles and structured in the same way (that is, in the way evolved by the ruling super power), but each country has been completely penetrated by a network of manipulatory instruments controlled by the superpower center and totally subordinated to its interests. In the stalemated world of nuclear parity, of course, that circumstance endows the system with an unprecedented degree of external stability compared with classical dictatorships. Many local crises which, in an isolated state, would lead to a change in the system, can be resolved through direct intervention by the armed forces of the rest of the bloc.

In the second place, if a feature of classical dictatorships is their lack of historical roots (frequently they appear to be no more than historical freaks, the fortuitous consequence of fortuitous social processes or of human and mob tendencies), the same cannot be said so facilely about our system. For even though our dictatorship has long since alienated itself completely from the social movements that give birth to it, the authenticity of these movements (and I am thinking of the proletarian and socialist movements of the nineteenth century) gives it undeniable historicity. These origins provided a solid foundation of sorts on which it could build until it became the utterly new social and political reality it is today, which has become so inextricably a part of the structure of the modern world. A feature of those historical origins was the "correct" understanding of social conflicts in the period from which those original movements emerged. The fact that at the very core of this "correct" understanding there was a genetic disposition toward the monstrous alienation characteristic of its subsequence development is not essential here. And in any case, this element also grew organically from the climate of that time and therefore can be said to have its origin there as well.

One legacy of that original "correct" understanding is a third peculiarity that makes our systems different from other modern dictatorships: it commands an incomparably more precise, logically structured, generally comprehensible and, in essence, extremely flexible ideology that, in its elaborateness and completeness, is almost a secularized religion. It of fears a ready answer to any question whatsoever; it can scarcely be accepted only in part, and accepting it has profound implications for human life. In an era when metaphysical and existential certainties are in a state of crisis, when people are being uprooted and alienated and are losing their sense of what this world means, this ideology inevitably has a certain hypnotic charm. To wandering humankind it offers an immediately available home: all one has to do is accept it, and suddenly everything becomes clear once more, life takes on new meaning, and all mysteries, unanswered questions, anxiety, and loneliness vanish. Of course, one pays dearly for this low-rent home: the price is abdication of oneí s own reason, conscience, and responsibility, for an essential aspect of this ideology is the consignment of reason and conscience to a higher authority. The principle involved here is that the center of power is identical with the center of truth. (In our case, the connection with Byzantine theocracy is direct: the highest secular authority is identical with the highest spiritual authority.) It is true of course that, all this aside, ideology no longer has any great influence on people, at least within our bloc (with the possible exception of Russia, where the serf mentality, with its blind, fatalistic respect for rulers and its automatic acceptance of all their claims, is still dominant and combined with a superpower patriotism which traditionally places the interests of empire higher than the interests of humanity). But this is not important, because ideology plays its role in our system very well (an issue to which I will return) precisely because it is what it is.

Fourth, the technique of exercising power in traditional dictatorships contains a necessary element of improvisation. The mechanisms for wielding power are for the most part not established firmly, and there is considerable room for accident and for the arbitrary and unregulated application of power. Socially, psychologically, and physically, conditions still exist for the expression of some form of opposition. In short, there are many seams on the surface which can split apart before the entire power structure has managed to stabilize. Our system, on the other hand, has been developing in the Soviet Union for over sixty years, and for approximately thirty years in Eastern Europe; moreover, several of its long-established structural features are derived from Czarist absolutism. In terms of the physical aspects of power, this has led to the creation of such intricate and well-developed mechanisms for the direct and indirect manipulation of the entire population that, as a physical power base, it represents something radically new. At the same time, let us not forget that the system is made significantly more effective by state ownership and central direction of all the means of productionThis gives the power structure an unprecedented and uncontrollable capacity to invest in itself (in the areas of the bureaucracy and the police, for example) and makes it easier for that structure, as the sole employer, to manipulate the day-to-day existence of all citizens.

Finally, if an atmosphere of revolutionary excitement, heroism, dedication, and boisterous violence on all sides characterizes classical dictatorships, then the last traces of such an atmosphere have vanished from the Soviet bloc. For, some time now this bloc has ceased to be a kind of enclave, isolated from the rest of the developed world and immune to processes occurring in it. To the contrary, the Soviet bloc is an integral part of that larger world, and it shares and shapes the world's destiny. This means in concrete terms that the hierarchy of values existing in the developed countries of the West has, in essence, appeared in our society (the long period of co-existence with the West has only hastened this process)In other words, what we have here is simply another form of the consumer and industrial society, with all its concomitant social, intellectual, and psychological consequences. It is impossible to understand the nature of power in our system properly without taking this into account.

The profound difference between our system-in terms of the nature of power-and what we traditionally understand by dictatorship, a difference I hope is clear even from this quite superficial comparison, has caused me to search for some term appropriate for our system, purely for the pur poses of this essay. If I refer to it henceforth as a "posttotalitarian" system, I am fully aware that this is perhaps not the most precise term, but I am unable to think of a better one. I do not wish to imply by the prefix "poso" that the system is no longer totalitarian; on the contrary, I mean that it is totalitarian in a way fundamentally different from classical dictatorships, different from totalitarianism as we usually understand it.

The circumstances I have mentioned, however, form only a circle of conditional factors and a kind of phenomenal framework for the actual composition of power in the posttotalitarian system, several aspects of which I shall now attempt to identify.

Go to Page: « Prev 1 2