WashPost infographic on recent thefts of nuclear materials

[kristopher]

27. Less Well Known Cases of Nuclear Terrorism and Nuclear Diversion in Russia

Aug. 20, 1997
Abstract:
Nuclear terrorism can take a variety of forms. The most frequently discussed form involves a terrorist group either stealing a nuclear weapon or building a nuclear device using stolen or illegally purchased nuclear material. In the former Soviet Union today, however, a more plausible situation involves an attack on or sabotage of civilian nuclear power facilities or spent fuel storage sites. There have been at least seven incidents since 1992 in which nuclear terrorism was threatened or used in Russia, five of which have involved nuclear power facilities.

The first three incidents occurred at the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) in Lithuania. The first occurred in February 1992, when authorities arrested a computer programmer named Oleg Savchuk on charges of trying to sabotage the reactor with a computer virus. Two-and-a-half years later, on 4 November 1994, Swedish authorities arrested Kestutis Mazuika, a Lithuanian citizen who delivered a letter to the Swedish prime minister's office that threatened the destruction of the Ignalina NPP unless a payment was made to the secret organization NUC-41 'W.' Mr. Mazuika was arrested and sentenced to four years in prison in Sweden, but was released after one year. He was then returned to Lithuania, where he was charged with 'Extortion of State Property' under Article 96 of the Lithuanian Criminal Code. He was not sentenced in Lithuania because of the Swedish prison term. The third incident at Ignalina occurred just a few days after Mr. Mazuika's threat. On 9 November 1994, the German Federal Ministry for Environment, Conservation, and Nuclear Safety notified the Lithuanian Nuclear Safety Inspectorate about information it had received regarding a plot to sabotage the Ignalina NPP. The plot involved Georgy Dekanidze, who threatened to blow the plant up in the event that his son Boris, on trial for murder, was sentenced to death. The threat was taken very seriously, and Units 1 and 2 of the plant were temporarily shut down as bomb experts and search dogs looked for evidence of sabotage. No such evidence was found and Dekanidze failed to follow through with his threats.

In addition, there have been at least two incidents at Russian nuclear power plants. In fall 1996, Gosatomnadzor (the Russian Nuclear Regulatory Agency) received an alert that an armed group of Chechens was moving towards the Balakovo NPP. All Russian nuclear facilities were given instructions to be on guard against possible terrorist actions. A Chechen group was spotted along the Volga River, but did not stop near the Balakovo reactor. It is unclear whether or not the group intended to target the reactor. In spring 1997, Russian authorities caught five men who had penetrated the Kursk NPP. The men, who probably had intended to attempt extortion, had reached the plant generator and allegedly had plans to overrun the control room and disable the reactor. Lastly, there were at least two known terrorist incidents that did not take place at nuclear power plants. The first, in 1995, was a terrorist threat in which an unpaid employee of the Severodinsk submarine production facility threatened the destruction of two reactors. Then in late 1995, a small amount of Cesium-137 was recovered in Moscow's Izmailovsky Park, placed there by Chechen separatists who claimed that they had buried four such radioactive sources in the park.

Regarding nuclear diversion, many analysts have concluded that the lull in illicit nuclear trafficking since the recovery of 2.72 kg of HEU in Prague in December 1994 indicates that the threat of nuclear diversion has greatly diminished. However, it is possible that important instances of diversion have been missed. At the April 1996 Moscow Nuclear Safety and Security Summit, Moscow pledged increased intelligence sharing, but it is doubtful that Moscow has provided any real information on this issue. There have been credible reports of proliferation-significant nuclear trafficking since December 1994. For example, in 1996 authorities in Belarus intercepted suspects possessing HEU that Russian and Georgian officials believe may have originated in Sukhumi, Georgia. Sukhumi is located in an area under the control of ethnic Abkhaz rebels and is not under IAEA safeguards. Neither the Russian nor the Georgian government is sure how much of the approximately 2 kg of weapons-usable HEU that was at Sukhumi in 1992 remains at the site. In a separate case, Gosatomnadzor reported the loss of about 1 kg of fresh HEU fuel enriched to 90% from Tomsk Polytechnical University in mid-1996. This material may accidentally have been included in a batch of spent fuel sent to Tomsk-7 (SKHK) in late 1994 or early 1995. Tomsk-7 officials have said that it would be impossible to try to find the material.

In addition, there have been cases...

http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/less-well-known-cases-nuclear-terrorism-and-nuclear-diversion-russia/