Gun Control & RKBA
In reply to the discussion: Does the Second Amendment belong in the Bill of Rights? Why or why not? [View all]Hoyt
(54,770 posts)Stevens, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., PETITIONERS v.
DICK ANTHONY HELLER
on writ of certiorari to the united states court ofappeals for the district of columbia circuit
[June 26, 2008]
Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Souter, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer join, dissenting.
The question presented by this case is not whether the Second Amendment protects a collective right or an individual right. Surely it protects a right that can be enforced by individuals. But a conclusion that the Second Amendment protects an individual right does not tell us anything about the scope of that right.
Guns are used to hunt, for self-defense, to commit crimes, for sporting activities, and to perform military duties. The Second Amendment plainly does not protect the right to use a gun to rob a bank; it is equally clear that it does encompass the right to use weapons for certain military purposes. Whether it also protects the right to possess and use guns for nonmilitary purposes like hunting and personal self-defense is the question presented by this case. The text of the Amendment, its history, and our decision in United States v. Miller, 307 U. S. 174 (1939) , provide a clear answer to that question.
The Second Amendment was adopted to protect the right of the people of each of the several States to maintain a well-regulated militia. It was a response to concerns raised during the ratification of the Constitution that the power of Congress to disarm the state militias and create a national standing army posed an intolerable threat to the sovereignty of the several States. Neither the text of the Amendment nor the arguments advanced by its proponents evidenced the slightest interest in limiting any legislatures authority to regulate private civilian uses of firearms. Specifically, there is no indication that the Framers of the Amendment intended to enshrine the common-law right of self-defense in the Constitution.
. . . . . .Miller, 307 U. S., at 178 The view of the Amendment we took in Millerthat it protects the right to keep and bear arms for certain military purposes, but that it does not curtail the Legislatures power to regulate the nonmilitary use and ownership of weaponsis both the most natural reading of the Amendments text and the interpretation most faithful to the history of its adoption.
Since our decision in Miller, hundreds of judges have relied on the view of the Amendment we endorsed there;2 we ourselves affirmed it in 1980. See Lewis v. United States, 445 U. S. 55 , n. 8 (1980).3 No new evidence has surfaced since 1980 supporting the view that the Amendment was intended to curtail the power of Congress to regulate civilian use or misuse of weapons. Indeed, a review of the drafting history of the Amendment demonstrates that its Framers rejected proposals that would have broadened its coverage to include such uses.
The opinion the Court announces today fails to identify any new evidence supporting the view that the Amendment was intended to limit the power of Congress to regulate civilian uses of weapons. Unable to point to any such evidence, the Court stakes its holding on a strained and unpersuasive reading of the Amendments text; significantly different provisions in the 1689 English Bill of Rights, and in various 19th-century State Constitutions; postenactment commentary that was available to the Court when it decided Miller; and, ultimately, a feeble attempt to distinguish Miller that places more emphasis on the Courts decisional process than on the reasoning in the opinion itself.
Even if the textual and historical arguments on both sides of the issue were evenly balanced, respect for the well-settled views of all of our predecessors on this Court, and for the rule of law itself, see Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U. S. 600, 636 (1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting), would prevent most jurists from endorsing such a dramatic upheaval in the law.4 As Justice Cardozo observed years ago, the labor of judges would be increased almost to the breaking point if every past decision could be reopened in every case, and one could not lay ones own course of bricks on the secure foundation of the courses laid by others who had gone before him. The Nature of the Judicial Process 149 (1921).
In this dissent I shall first explain why our decision in Miller was faithful to the text of the Second Amendment and the purposes revealed in its drafting history. I shall then comment on the postratification history of the Amendment, which makes abundantly clear that the Amendment should not be interpreted as limiting the authority of Congress to regulate the use or possession of firearms for purely civilian purposes.
The text of the Second Amendment is brief. It provides: A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.
Three portions of that text merit special focus: the introductory language defining the Amendments purpose, the class of persons encompassed within its reach, and the unitary nature of the right that it protects.
A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State
The preamble to the Second Amendment makes three important points. It identifies the preservation of the militia as the Amendments purpose; it explains that the militia is necessary to the security of a free State; and it recognizes that the militia must be well regulated. In all three respects it is comparable to provisions in several State Declarations of Rights that were adopted roughly contemporaneously with the Declaration of Independence.5 Those state provisions highlight the importance members of the founding generation attached to the maintenance of state militias; they also underscore the profound fear shared by many in that era of the dangers posed by standing armies.6 While the need for state militias has not been a matter of significant public interest for almost two centuries, that fact should not obscure the contemporary concerns that animated the Framers.
The parallels between the Second Amendment and these state declarations, and the Second Amendment s omission of any statement of purpose related to the right to use firearms for hunting or personal self-defense, is especially striking in light of the fact that the Declarations of Rights of Pennsylvania and Vermont did expresslyprotect such civilian uses at the time. Article XIII of Pennsylvanias 1776 Declaration of Rights announced that the people have a right to bear arms for the defence of themselves and the state, 1 Schwartz 266 (emphasis added); §43 of the Declaration assured that the inhabitants of this state shall have the liberty to fowl and hunt in seasonable times on the lands they hold, and on all other lands therein not inclosed, id., at 274. And Article XV of the 1777 Vermont Declaration of Rights guaranteed [t]hat the people have a right to bear arms for the defence of themselves and the State. Id., at 324 (emphasis added). The contrast between those two declarations and the Second Amendment reinforces the clear statement of purpose announced in the Amendments preamble. It confirms that the Framers single-minded focus in crafting the constitutional guarantee to keep and bear arms was on military uses of firearms, which they viewed in the context of service in state militias.
The preamble thus both sets forth the object of the Amendment and informs the meaning of the remainder of its text. Such text should not be treated as mere surplusage, for t cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 174 (1803).
The Court today tries to denigrate the importance of this clause of the Amendment by beginning its analysis with the Amendments operative provision and returning to the preamble merely to ensure that our reading of the operative clause is consistent with the announced purpose. Ante, at 5. That is not how this Court ordinarily reads such texts, and it is not how the preamble would have been viewed at the time the Amendment was adopted. While the Court makes the novel suggestion that it need only find some logical connection between the preamble and the operative provision, it does acknowledge that a prefatory clause may resolve an ambiguity in the text. Ante, at 4.7 Without identifying any language in the text that even mentions civilian uses of firearms, the Court proceeds to find its preferred reading in what is at best an ambiguous text, and then concludes that its reading is not foreclosed by the preamble. Perhaps the Courts approach to the text is acceptable advocacy, but it is surely an unusual approach for judges to follow.
The right of the people
The centerpiece of the Courts textual argument is its insistence that the words the people as used in the Second Amendment must have the same meaning, and protect the same class of individuals, as when they are used in the First and Fourth Amendment s. According to the Court, in all three provisionsas well as the Constitutions preamble, section 2 of Article I, and the Tenth Amendment the term unambiguously refers to all members of the political community, not an unspecified subset. Ante, at 6. But the Court itself reads the Second Amendment to protect a subset significantly narrower than the class of persons protected by the First and Fourth Amendment s; when it finally drills down on the substantive meaning of the Second Amendment , the Court limits the protected class to law-abiding, responsible citizens, ante, at 63. But the class of persons protected by the First and Fourth Amendment s is not so limited; for even felons (and presumably irresponsible citizens as well) may invoke the protections of those constitutional provisions. The Court offers no way to harmonize its conflicting pronouncements.
The Court also overlooks the significance of the way the Framers used the phrase the people in these constitutional provisions. In the First Amendment , no words define the class of individuals entitled to speak, to publish, or to worship; in that Amendment it is only the right peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances, that is described as a right of the people. These rights contemplate collective action. While the right peaceably to assemble protects the individual rights of those persons participating in the assembly, its concern is with action engaged in by members of a group, rather than any single individual. Likewise, although the act of petitioning the Government is a right that can be exercised by individuals, it is primarily collective in nature. For if they are to be effective, petitions must involve groups of individuals acting in concert.
Similarly, the words the people in the Second Amendment refer back to the object announced in the Amendments preamble. They remind us that it is the collective action of individuals having a duty to serve in the militia that the text directly protects and, perhaps more importantly, that the ultimate purpose of the Amendment was to protect the States share of the divided sovereignty created by the Constitution.
As used in the Fourth Amendment , the people describes the class of persons protected from unreasonable searches and seizures by Government officials. It is true that the Fourth Amendment describes a right that need not be exercised in any collective sense. But that observation does not settle the meaning of the phrase the people when used in the Second Amendment . For, as we have seen, the phrase means something quite different in the Petition and Assembly Clauses of the First Amendment . Although the abstract definition of the phrase the people could carry the same meaning in the Second Amendment as in the Fourth Amendment , the preamble of the Second Amendment suggests that the uses of the phrase in the First and Second Amendment s are the same in referring to a collective activity. By way of contrast, the Fourth Amendment describes a right against governmental interference rather than an affirmative right to engage in protected conduct, and so refers to a right to protect a purely individual interest. As used in the Second Amendment , the words the people do not enlarge the right to keep and bear arms to encompass use or ownership of weapons outside the context of service in a well-regulated militia.
To keep and bear Arms
Although the Courts discussion of these words treats them as two phrasesas if they read to keep and to bearthey describe a unitary right: to possess arms if needed for military purposes and to use them in conjunction with military activities.
As a threshold matter, it is worth pausing to note an oddity in the Courts interpretation of to keep and bear arms. Unlike the Court of Appeals, the Court does not read that phrase to create a right to possess arms for lawful, private purposes. Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F. 3d 370, 382 (CADC 2007). Instead, the Court limits the Amendments protection to the right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation. Ante, at 19. No party or amicus urged this interpretation; the Court appears to have fashioned it out of whole cloth. But although this novel limitation lacks support in the text of the Amendment, the Amendments text does justify a different limitation: the right to keep and bear arms protects only a right to possess and use firearms in connection with service in a state-organized militia.
The term bear arms is a familiar idiom; when used unadorned by any additional words, its meaning is to serve as a soldier, do military service, fight. 1 Oxford English Dictionary 634 (2d ed. 1989). It is derived from the Latin arma ferre, which, translated literally, means to bear [ferre] war equipment [arma]. Brief for Professors of Linguistics and English as Amici Curiae 19. One 18th-century dictionary defined arms as weapons of offence, or armour of defence, 1 S. Johnson, A Dictionary of theEnglish Language(1755), and another contemporaneous source explained that y arms, we understand those instruments of offence generally made use of in war; such as firearms, swords, & c. By weapons, we more particularly mean instruments of other kinds (exclusive of fire-arms), made use of as offensive, on special occasions. 1 J. Trusler, The Distinction Between Words Esteemed Synonymous in the English Language37 (1794).8 Had the Framers wished to expand the meaning of the phrase bear arms to encompass civilian possession and use, they could have done so by the addition of phrases such as for the defense of themselves, as was done in the Pennsylvania and Vermont Declarations of Rights. The unmodified use of bear arms, by contrast, refers most naturally to a military purpose, as evidenced by its use in literally dozens of contemporary texts.9 The absence of any reference to civilian uses of weapons tailors the text of the Amendment to the purpose identified in its preamble.10 But when discussing these words, the Court simply ignores the preamble.
The Court argues that a qualifying phrase that contradicts the word or phrase it modifies is unknown this side of the looking glass. Ante, at 15. But this fundamentally fails to grasp the point. The stand-alone phrase bear arms most naturally conveys a military meaning unless the addition of a qualifying phrase signals that a different meaning is intended. When, as in this case, there is no such qualifier, the most natural meaning is the military one; and, in the absence of any qualifier, it is all the more appropriate to look to the preamble to confirm the natural meaning of the text.11 The Courts objection is particularly puzzling in light of its own contention that the addition of the modifier against changes the meaning of bear arms. Compare ante, at 10 (defining bear arms to mean carrying [a weapon] for a particular purposeconfrontation), with ante, at 12 (The phrase bear Arms also had at the time of the founding an idiomatic meaning that was significantly different from its natural meaning: to serve as a soldier, do military service, fight or to wage war. But it unequivocally bore that idiomatic meaning only when followed by the preposition against. (citations and some internal quotation marks omitted)).
The Amendments use of the term keep in no way contradicts the military meaning conveyed by the phrase bear arms and the Amendments preamble. To the contrary, a number of state militia laws in effect at the time of the Second Amendment s drafting used the term keep to describe the requirement that militia members store their arms at their homes, ready to be used for service when necessary. The Virginia military law, for example, ordered that every one of the said officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates, shall constantly keep the aforesaid arms, accoutrements, and ammunition, ready to be produced whenever called for by his commanding officer. Act for Regulating and Disciplining the Militia, 1785 Va. Acts ch. 1, §3, p. 2 (emphasis added).12 [K]eep and bear arms thus perfectly describes the responsibilities of a framing-era militia member.
This reading is confirmed by the fact that the clause protects only one right, rather than two. It does not describe a right to keep arms and a separate right to bear arms. Rather, the single right that it does describe is both a duty and a right to have arms available and ready for military service, and to use them for military purposes when necessary.13 Different language surely would have been used to protect nonmilitary use and possession of weapons from regulation if such an intent had played any role in the drafting of the Amendment.
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Those who are not throwing up by now, may read the whole work at http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/07-290.ZD.html
Hopefully the 5 right wing Justices will fade away in time, unless the NRA, right wing gun groups, right wing gun owners, and the like keep bigoted, callous, right wingers in office.
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