From Philosophical Investigations:
109. It was true to say that our considerations could not be scientific ones. It was not of any possible interest to us to find out empirically 'that, contrary to our preconceived ideas, it is possible to think such-and-such'whatever that may mean. (The
conception of thought as a gaseous medium.) And we may not advance any kind of theory. There must not be anything hypothetical
in our considerations. We must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its place. And this description
gets its light, that is to say its purpose, from the philosophical problems. These are, of course, not empirical problems;
they are solved, rather, by looking into the workings of our language, and that in such a way as to make us recognize those
workings: in despite of an urge to misunderstand them. The problems are solved , not by giving new information, but by
arranging what we have always known. Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language.
And, yes, by setting up philosophy as a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence, we risk bewitching our intelligence through philosophizing. It is an on-going battle, and if we tend to increase our bewitchment, hopefully, someone points that out to us.